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Judicial Review of National
Regulations Under SMCRA and
Holmes Limestone Co. v. Andrus: Is
the District Court for the District of
Columbia the Only Proper Forum?
INTRODUCTION

The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 19771
was enacted to assure that the nation's requirements for coal
are met in a manner consistent with the protection of the
environment. 2 To facilitate this purpose, the Act authorizes
the Secretary of the Interior to issue regulations covering the
mining industry.3 Jurisdiction for judicial review of these regulations is governed by Section 526(a)(1) of the Act. 4 Under

. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, PUB. L. No. 95-87,
3§ 101-908, 91 Stat. 445 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982)) [hereinafter
SMCRA or "the Act"].
2 SMRCA § 102, 30 U.S.C. § 1202 (1982).
3 See SMRCA § 501, 30 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982). This section contains the
informal rulemaking machinery of the Act. Under the section, regulations are not to
become effective until the Secretary has published them as proposed regulations in
the Federal Register and has afforded interested parties a period of not less than
thirty days after publication to submit their written comments. In addition, at least
one public hearing must be held on the proposed regulations. Notice of this hearing
is to be published with the proposed regulation.

4 SMCRA § 526(a)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1) (1982). Section 561(a)(1) pro-

vides:
Any action of the Secretary to approve or disapprove a State program
or to prepare or promulgate a Federal program pursuant to this chapter
shall be subject to judicial review by the United States District Court
for the District which includes the capital of the State whose program
is at issue. Any action by the Secretary promulgating national rules or
regulations including standards pursuant to sections 1251, 1265, 1266,
and 1273 of this title shall be subject to judicial review in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia Circuit. Any other
action constituting rulemaking by the Secretary shall be subject to ju-
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this section, any action of the Secretary promulgating national
rules or regulations5 "shall be subject to judicial review in the

United States District Court for the District of Columbia Cir6
cuit.''
In spite of this seemingly clear mandate, two courts have
held that federal district courts for the districts where mining
operations are located have concurrent jurisdiction to review
the promulgation of national regulations. 7 Focusing on Holmes
Limestone Co. v. Andrus,' this Comment examines the legis-

Id.

dicial review only by the United States District Court for the District in
which the surface coal mining operation is located. Any action subject
to judicial review under this subsection shall be affirmed unless the
court concludes that such action is arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise
inconsistent with law. A petition for review of any action subject to
judicial review under this subsection shall be filed in the appropriate
Court within sixty days from the date of such action, or after such date
if the petition is based solely on grounds arising after the sixtieth day.
Any such petition may be made by any person who participated in the
administrative proceedings and who is aggrieved by the action of the
Secretary.

National rules and regulations are those which apply to federal lands or those
which posit rules or performance standards which are applicable to all mining operations in the country. For the section dealing with federal lands, see SMRCA § 523,
30 U.S.C. § 1273 (1982). Regulations which implement national rules and performance standards may be promulgated under several sections in Title V of the Act. See,
e.g., SMRCA § 515(b), 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b) (1982) (general reclamation performance
standards); SMRCA § 516, 30 U.S.C. § 1266 (1982) (requirements governing the
surface effects of underground mining); SMCRA § 522(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e) (1982)
(restricts mining near schools, highways, buildings, and cemeteries).
6 SMCRA § 526(a)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1) (1982).
, See Holmes Limestone Co. v. Andrus, 655 F.2d 732 (6th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied sub nom., Watt v. Holmes Limestone Co., 456 U.S. 995 (1982); Utah Int'l
v. Department of Interior, 553 F. Supp. 872 (D. Utah 1982). Cf. B & M Coal v.
Office of Surface Mining Reclamation, 531 F. Supp. 677, 680 (S.D. Ind. 1982)
(jurisdiction lies in the district where the mining operation is located when the
application of the regulation is alleged to work a constitutional deprivation). Contra
Drummond Coal Co. v. Watt, 735 F.2d 469 (11th Cir. 1984); Tug Valley Recovery
Center v. Watt, 703 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1982); Virginia Ex Rel. Va. Dept. of Conservation v. Watt, 741 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. granted sub nom., Virginia Dept.
of Conservation v. Clark, 105 S. Ct. 379 (1984), cert. dismissed, 105 S. Ct. 983
(1985); Union Carbide Corp. v. Andrus, 9 Envtl. L. Rept. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20701
(S.D. W. Va. 1979); Clinchfield Coal Co. v. DOI, 802 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Troup, 321 F.2d 194 (3d Cir. 1987); UGI Corp. v. Watt, 644 F.
Supp. 16 (M.D. Pa. 1985).
1 655 F.2d 732 (6th Cir. 1981).
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lative history 9 and policy considerations 0 invoked in the debate
as to whether national regulations promulgated under SMCRA
may be reviewed outside the District of Columbia. The Comment concludes that such review should be exclusive to the
District Court for the District of Columbia.
A.

The Challenged Regulation

Holmes Limestone Co. v. Andrus" involved a challenge to
a national regulation by an Ohio mine operator, Holmes Limestone Company.' 2 The regulation in question defined "ceme-

tery" as "any area of land where human bodies are interred"' 3
and was promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior as part
of the implementation of Section 522(e) of SMCRA.14 This

9 See infra notes 39-65 and accompanying text.
1o See infra notes 66-97 and accompanying text.
- 655 F.2d 732 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom., Watt v. Holmes Limestone Co., 456 U.S. 995 (1982).
,1Holmes Limestone Co. v. Andrus, 11 Envtl. L. Rept. (Entl. L. Inst.) 20166,
20167 (N.D. Ohio 1980), rev'd, 655 F.2d 732 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub noma.,
Watt v. Holmes Limestone Co., 456 U.S. 995 (1982) ("There can be no doubt but
that the [challenged regulation] is a national rule, intended for national application."). See generally Comment, Regulatory Revisions to the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act: An Exercise in Administrative Legislation?, 31 KAN. L. REV.
279, 287-88 (1983).
'
30 C.F.R. § 761.5 (1979). This regulation was later changed to define cemeteries as "any area of land where human bodies are interred, except for private
family burial grounds." See 48 FED. REG. 41,348 (1983), 30 C.F.R. § 761.5 (1984)
(emphasis added). This version of the regulation was successfully challenged in In
Re Permanent Surface Mining Litig., 620 F. Supp. 1519, 1557-58 (D.D.C. 1985). In
that case, the government argued that the regulation was revised in response to the
scenario encountered in Holmes in which landowners desired to have mining conducted closer than 100 feet to family cemeteries. Id. at 1558. The Court remanded
the regulation to the Secretary because it found the definition inconsistent with the
language of SMCRA section 522(e)(5) (forbidding mining closer than 100 feet to a
cemetery), stating that "the plain meaning of the word cemetery admits of no
distinction between public and private burial places." Id. The Court also found that
the definition was arbitrary in that it excluded protection for all private burial plots
regardless of whether the owners desired that mining take place closer than 100 feet
to family cemeteries. Id.
" SMCRA § 522, 30 U.S.C. § 1272 (1982). This section of the Act covers the
designation of certain areas as unsuitable for surface coal mining. The relevant
provision in the Holmes case was section 522(e)(5), which states:
(e) After August 3, 1977 and subject to valid existing rights no surface
coal mining operations except those which exist on August 3, 1977, shall
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section contains a provision which forbids mining within 100
feet of a cemetery.' 5
B.

Facts of Holmes Limestone

Holmes Limestone Company was mining coal on two farms
leased from Amish farmers in Holmes County, Ohio.' 6 There
were small family burial plots located on each of these farms,
and the state mining permit which the company obtained prohibited mining within 100 feet of a cemetery. 17 This prohibition
was in accord with the applicable state regulation which was
identical to Section 522(e) of SMCRA.' 8 In December of 1979,
the Holmes operation was nearing a burial site on one of the
farms. Desiring to realize the profits available through mining
closer to the gravesites, and with the blessing of the farm
owner (who also stood to lose a good deal of money should
the 100 foot limitation be strictly enforced), 19 Holmes obtained
a ruling from the Ohio Reclamation Board of Review that
"cemetery" as used in the limiting regulation did not apply to
the private family burial site at issue. 20 The Board ordered that
Holmes' permit be amended to allow mining in2 the area between 25 and 100 feet of the family burial plot. '

be permitted(5) within three hundred feet from any occupied dwelling, unless waived
by the owner thereof, nor within three hundred feet of any public
building, school, church, community, or institutional building, public
park, or within one hundred feet of a cemetery.
SMCRA § 522(e)(5), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(5) (1982) (emphasis added). See generally
Comment, Western Coalfields Declared Unsuitable for Mining Amidst Legal Challenges to §522 of Surface Mining Act, 11 Envtl. L. Rept. (Evtl. L. Inst.) 10048,
10049-50 (Feb. 1981); Note, Citizen Participation in the Regulation of Surface Mining, 81 W. VA. L. REV. 675, 700-03 (1979).
11 SMCRA § 522(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e) (1982).
,6 Holmes, 655 F.2d at 735.
I at 735-36.
Id.
This regulation was modeled
' Ohio Adminstrative Code, § 1501:13-19-03(c).
after section 522(e) of SMRCA. However, at the time of the Holmes case, Ohio had
no statutory definition of the word "cemetery." See Holmes, 11 Envtl. L. Rept. at
20166.
,9 Mining in the disputed area would have yielded approximately 6,000 to 8,000
tons of coal for which the farm's owner was to have been paid approximately $12,000
in royalties. See Holmes, 11 Envtl. L. Rept. at 20167.
20 Holmes, 655 F.2d at 736.
21 Id.
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In the meantime, the Chief of Ohio's Division of Natural
Resources was advised by officers of the Office of Surface
Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM) that should he
issue the amended permit, the state would not be in compliance
with the Act and enforcement action against Holmes might
ensue. 22 The Chief was unsuccessful in obtaining a stay of the
Ohio Reclamation Board's order in Ohio's Franklin County
Court of Common Pleas and the court ordered him to issue
the amended permit. 23 Holmes then proceeded to mine the area
between 25 and 100 feet of the burial site and filed suit on
June 6, 1980, in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio seeking to enjoin the Secretary of
the Interior from enforcing the federal 100 feet limitation and
24
challenging the Secretary's regulation defining "cemetery."
Holmes was cited for violating Section 522(e)(5) of the Act on
June 11, 1980.25

C.

Disposition of the Case by the Trial Court

The trial court expressed sympathy for the operator's position, 26 but nevertheless found that it lacked jurisdiction to
review the validity of the challenged national regulation. 27 The

22

Id.

23

Id.

26

Id. at 736-37.

11 Id. at 736.
26 See Holmes, 11 Envtl L. Rep. at 20166. Commenting on the operator's past
mining activities the court stated: "Holmes has ... earned an~impeccable reputation
for the care with which it has taken in mining within a few feet of ... cemeteries."
Id.
27 Holmes, 11 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20167. As an initial matter, the District Court
dismissed the Secretary's argument that the court had no jurisdiction because Holmes
had failed to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by SMCRA § 525, 30
U.S.C. § 1275 (1982). Id. at 2167. For a helpful discussion of the procedures under
section 525, see B & M Coal Corp. v. Office of Surface Mining Regulation and
Enforcement, 699 F.2d 381, 383-84 (7th Cir. 1983).
It is an axiom of administrative law that administrative remedies must be
exhausted before judicial review of administrative action may be obtained. See
generally K. DAVIs ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, §§ 26.1-26.15 (1984). However,
a challenge to the rulemaking of an agency as opposed to the enforcement of a
regulation entails a different analysis. Once the agency publishes the regulation with
an effective final date and that date has passed, then rulemaking is complete and
there are no further administrative remedies to be exhausted. See Abbott Laboratories
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court drew support for this holding from a similar framework
for judicial review under the Clean Air Act 28 and stated that
under such statutory schemes:
The Congressional intent is to provide for judicial review of
administrative regulations of national application in one specific court, and within a relatively short period of time (30
to 60 days) after their promulgation. Thereafter, the validity
of the application of the regulation may be left to the geographically appropriate United States District Courts. So
long as the opportunity for testing the validity of the regulation has been provided, persons against whom the regulation is later applied may be precluded from raising the validity
of the regulation as a defense, without violation of due
process.29

The court found that, under Section 526(a)(1), 30 Holmes' challenge to the regulatory definition of cemetery could only have
been properly brought in the District Court for the District of
31
Columbia.
D.

Decision of the Sixth Circuit

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reversed and remanded, holding that Holmes could challenge
the regulation in Ohio.3 2 The Secretary of the Interior appealed, but his petition for review was denied by the Supreme
Court. 3 Justice White filed a dissent from the denial of cer34
tiorari in which Justice Blackmun joined.

v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149-52 (1967). Noting that Holmes had filed its complaint
five days before it was cited by OSM, the trial court in Holmes stated, "at the time
Holmes filed its complaint, there had been no agency action requiring Holmes to
seek relief through administrative channels; hence, there were no administrative
remedies to exhaust." Holmes, 11 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20167. Therefore, the court
reasoned that the OSM citation could not operate to deprive it of jurisdiction. Id.
For a discussion of the exhaustion doctrine in the enforcement context under SMCRA,
see generally Shawnee Coal Co. v. Andrus, 661 F.2d 1083, 1089 (6th Cir. 1981).
21 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §7607(b)(1) (1982).
29 Holmes, 11 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20167.
30 SMCRA § 526(a)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1).
3' Holmes, 11 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20167.
32 Holmes, 655 F.2d at 737-39.
11 Watt v. Holmes Limestone, 456 U.S. 995 (1982).
See id. at 995-97.
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Judge Weick wrote the majority opinion for the Sixth

Circuit" and Judge Merritt filed a concurrence. 36 Both opinions
relied on two factors to support the holding that national
regulations are subject to challenge in district courts where
mining operations are located: the legislative history of Section
526(a)(1), 3 7 and the policy against limiting review of final agency

actions.38
I.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 526(A)(1)

The House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs reported its version of the surface mining bill (H.R. 2)39 on April
22, 1977. The Senate version (S.7), 40 was reported out of the
Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources on May
10, 1977. These bills provided that national regulations were
to be subject to review only in the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. 41 The bills were passed
and submitted to the Conference Committee for resolution of
differences. The bill which the Conference Committee recommended - the version which ultimately became law - omitted

the word "only" and simply stated that the promulgation of
national regulations "shall be subject to judicial review in the
'42
United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
The explanation of the changes made to Section 526(a)(1)
offered by the Conference Committee merely states a congressional desire for review in the "appropriate District Courts;"

11See Holmes, 655

F.2d at 733-39.

11 Id. at 739-41.

7 Id. at 737, 740-41. For a bibliography of the legislative history of SMCRA,
see generally Note, A Summary of the Legislative History of the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 and the Relevant Legal PeriodicalLiterature,
81 W. VA. L. REV. 775 (1979).
11 Holmes, 655 F.2d at 737-38, 740-41.
31H.R. 2, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
40 S. 7, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).

4 See H.R. 2, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 526(a)(1)(1977), reprinted in H.R. REP.
95-218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1977); § 7, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 426(a)(1)(1977),
reprinted in S. REP. No. 95-128, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1977).
42 See H.R. REP. 95-493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 75 (1977).
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was omitted from

The Interpretation of the Sixth Circuit

In Holmes Limestone Co. v. Andrus,44 the court interpreted
this omission as evincing a congressional intent not to limit
the availability of review, stating that "[i]f Congress had desired to limit jurisdiction to the District of Columbia, it would
never have deleted the word only from the bill." 45 The Holmes
majority pointed to no other legislative history to support the
view that Congress intended to allow regulations to be challenged outside the District of Columbia and limited its discus46
sion of the matter to one brief paragraph.
B.

Drummond Coal Co. v. Watt 47

In 1984, the Eleventh Circuit engaged in a more extensive
interpretation of the language of Section 526(a)(1).41 The case,

See H.R. REP. No. 95-493, 95th Cong., 1st. Sess. 112, reprinted in 1977 U.S.
& ADMIN. NEWS 728, 743. The relevant explanatory section provides:
Section 526. The House bill and Senate amendment are similar in their
treatment of judicial review. The House bill provides for judicial review
of the Secretary's decisions regarding approval or disapproval of a State
program in the U.S. Court of Appeals in the circuit in which the State
is located while regulationswere subject to review in the District Court
for the District of Columbia. Under the House bill, other orders are
subject to review in the U.S. District Court in the district in which the
surface coal mine is located. The Senate amendment established jurisdiction in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the areas in which the operation
is located.
Id. (emphasis added). The conferees agreed to language vesting jurisdiction in
the appropriate District Courts and established that review of the Secretary's action
to approve or disapprove State programs, promulgate a Federal program, promulgate
regulations and any action constituting rulemaking shall be based on an arbitrary or
capricious standard.
Id. (emphasis added)
" 655 F.2d 732 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom., Watt v. Holmes Limestone Co., 456 U.S. 995 (1982).
11 Id. at 737 (emphasis in original).
46 Id.
"' Drummond Coal Co. v. Watt, 735 F.2d 469 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (cited in short
form as Drummond Coal).
IsId.
41

CODE CONG.
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Drummond Coal Co. v. Watt, 49 involved a challenge to a
regulation ° which prohibited operators from deducting the
moisture content of coal in calculating the weight of coal
subject to a reclamation fee. 5 The District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama determined it had jurisdiction
of the case.5 2 The Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that the
plain language of the statute, the lack of an express congressional intent to provide concurrent jurisdiction, and the importance of uniform review of national regulations issued under
SMCRA called for an "explicit rejection" of the Holmes interpretation of the judicial review section.5 3 The court reasoned
that the provision that judicial review "shall" lie in the District
Court for the District of Columbia indicated a congressional
intent that such review be exclusive because "shall" is a mandatory form. 5 4 The deletion of the word "only" in the final
version of the bill did not convince the court that Congress
harbored a contrary intent. The court noted that "although
the omission may represent an intention to vest concurrent
jurisdiction, as the government notes, it may represent instead
a congressional recognition of the force of the word 'shall'
and an intention to avoid redundancy." 55
C.

Analysis

Although it did not address the issue, the Holmes holding
necessarily entails a construction of "shall" as a permissive
form (i.e., as not foreclosing review in other forums). As a
general rule, whether a statutory provision is permissive or
mandatory should be gleaned from the specific language employed, and the use of the word "shall" typically indicates a
mandatory legislative intent.5 6 However, "shall" may be read

,9 Id.
So

See 30 C.F.R. § 870.12(b)(3)(i) (1983).

See SMRCA § 402, 30 U.S.C. § 1232 (1982).
Drummond Coal, 735 F.2d at 472.
" Id.
at 472-76.
5,Id. at 473.
" Id.
at 474.
16 See 73 AM. JUR. 2d Statutes § 22 (1974); N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION, §. 57.03 (4th ed. 1984).
"
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as a permissive term (i.e., as synonymous with "may") when
the legislative history indicates an intent to that effect. 7 Given
the above-mentioned deletion of the word "only," ' one can

only surmise that the Holmes court had this canon of construction in mind when interpreting Section 526(a)(1) .

9

The Eleventh Circuit's argument that the deletion was made
"in recognition of the force of the word 'shall' "6 is unpersuasive in view of the fact that the word "only" was retained
elsewhere in the same section in a sentence which also employs
the word "shall." The section provides that "[a]ny other action constituting rulemaking by the Secretary shall be subject
to judicial review only by the United States District Court for

the District in which the surface coal mining operation is
located." (emphasis added). 61 The Drummond court offered no
explanation as to why Congress would seek to eliminate what

seemed to be a redundancy in one part of the section while
refraining from doing so in another. Similarly, it is- difficult
to accept Justice White's suggestion in his dissent from denial

of certiorari in the Holmes case that the omission may have
been inadvertent. 62 The Conference Committee changed the
reviewing court from the Court of Appeals to the District
Court for the District of Columbia in its revision of Section
526(a)(1). 63 It is difficult to accept that the committee would
make such a substantial change without giving attention to all
the language employed. Rather than assume that the omission

" See 73 AM.
JUR. 2d Statutes § 25 (1974); N. SINGER, supra note 56, at §
57.03.
, See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
9 See also Russello v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 296, 301 (1983) ("Where
Congress included limiting language in an earlier version of a bill but deletes it prior
to enactment, it may be presumed that the limitation was not intended."). But cf.
Drummond Coal Co. v. Watt, 755 F.2d 469, 474 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (citing Trailmobile
Co. v. Whirls, 331 U.S. 40, 61 (1947) "The interpretation of statutes cannot safely
be made to rest upon mute intermediate legislative maneuvers.").
60 See Drummond Coal Co., 755 F.2d at 474.
61 See SMRCA § 526(a)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 127(a)(1) (1982).
,2 See Watt v. Holmes Limestone, 456 U.S. 995, 996 (1982) (denying certoriari
to Holmes Limestone Co. v. Andrus, 655 F.2d 732 (6th Cir. 1981)).
63 Compare H.R. 2, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 526(a)(1) (1977), reprinted in H.R.
REP. No. 95-218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1977); S. 7, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., §
426(a)(1) (1977), reprinted in S. REP. No. 95-128, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 41 (1977)
with SMRCA § 526(a)(1), 30 U.S.C. 1276(a)(1) (1982).
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was the product of sloppy legislative housekeeping, it is plausible to infer some measure of intent on the part of the legislature. 64 The pertinent inquiry then becomes: is this intent
adequate to support the Holmes holding that review of national

regulations under SMCRA may not be limited to the District
of Columbia? This entails an assessment as to whether the
Holmes court properly invoked and applied the policy against
65
restricting review of final agency actions.
II.

POLICY AGAINST LIMITING REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCY ACTIONS

Before a statute will be held to restrict judicial review of
administrative actions, the traditional standard requires "clear
and convincing evidence" of legislative intent to limit access

to judicial review. 66 This requirement reflects the presumption
of reviewability embodied in the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA)67 and that act's provision that review may be limited
by statute. 68 Recently, the Supreme Court has followed a more
lenient evidentiary standard to the effect that this presumption
may be overcome where congressional intent to that effect is
"fairly discernible in the legislative scheme." ' 69 In order to

64See generally 73 AM. JUR. 2d Statutes § 169 (1974); Russello, 104 S. Ct. at
301.
" See infra notes 67-89 and accompanying text.
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 131, 140-41 (1967); See generally
K. DAvIS, supra note 27, at § 28.11.
6' See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982); Abbott, 387 U.S. at 140; Holmes, 655 F.2d at
738.
, See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(l) (1982). For cases involving clear statutory limitations
of review see, e.g., Carter v. Cleland, 643 F.2d 1, 2-4 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (provision at
38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1976) that Veteran's Administration decisions concerning eligibility for benefits "shall be final and conclusive and no other official or any court
of the United States shall have power of jurisdiction to review any such decision");
Graham v. Caston, 568 F.2d 1092, 1097 (5th Cir. 1978) (similar provision under 12
U.S.C. § 1735 (1970) that decisions of Secretary of HUD regarding homeowners'
claims for defects in property "shall not be subject to judicial review").
69 Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 104 S. Ct. 2450, 2457 (1984) (individual
consumers cannot obtain judicial review of orders issued by Secretary of Agriculture
setting minimum prices for "reconstituted milk" under Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937). See also Morris v. Gresette, 432 U.S. 491, 501 (1976) (Attorney
General's failure to interpose objection within 60 days to state reapportionment plan
under Voting Rights Act held nonreviewable even though no provision of the Act
"
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determine whether a statute effectively precludes review, courts
must analyze the language and the legislative history of an act
to glean the legislative intent. 70 Review will not be precluded
merely because the statute is silent 7' or states that agency action
is "final." 72 Further, courts must consider whether "the entire
legislative history" of a particular act indicates a congressional
intent to preclude review.7" Thus, nonreviewability may be
inferred from the context of a legislative scheme even though
74
the act contains no provision expressly cutting off review.
A.
The Holmes Court Utilized Too Rigid an Evidentiary
Standard in Applying the Policy Against Cutting Off Review
The Holmes case represents a problematical application of
the above principles. Commenting on the government's position in the case, the court stated that the Secretary sought to
preclude the district court where the mining operation is located from ruling on his actions. 7 The court then invoked the
authority of Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, which held that
review will not be cut off "unless there is persuasive reason
to believe that such was the purpose of Congress." 7

6

Thus,

expressly precludes review); Gott v. Walters, 756 F.2d 902, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(decisions of Veteran's Administration held nonreviewable); K. DAvis, supra note 27,
at § 28.09 (Supp. 1982).
10See Block, 104 S. Ct. at 2454.
" See Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 309 (1944); Sierra Club v. Peterson,
705 F.2d 1475 (9th Cir. 1983) (removal of citizen's suit provision in conference after
its passage by the Senate is not an indication of congressional intent to prohibit suit
by environmental organization under Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act where Act itself is silent as to review preclusion).
" See Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 50-52 (1955); Wayne State Univ.
v. Cleland, 590 F.2d 627, 631-32 (6th Cir. 1978).
" See Abbott, 387 U.S. at 141; Morris, 432 U.S. at 501, 505 n.20; Block 104
S. Ct. at 2456-57.
11 See Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1970); Morris, 432 U.S. at 50009; Block, 104 S. Ct. at 2456.
71 See Holmes, 655 F.2d at 738.
11 Id. (citing Abbott, 387 U.S. at 140). The Holmes court seemed to be proceeding on the assumption that this grant of exclusive jurisdiction raises "preclusion
of review" concerns. Rather than the District of Columbia venue provision, it is the
sixty-day time limit of the statute that can actually work to totally preclude review.
See SMCRA § 526(a)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1) (1982) (aggrieved party has sixty
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given the above-mentioned legislative history, the court was
unconvinced that the provision in Section 526(a)(1) that national regulations "shall be subject to review in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia" 77 displayed
the requisite intent to limit review. 7 By delving into the legislative history rather than deriving congressional intent from
the plain language of the statute itself, 79 the Holmes court
required even greater than "clear and convincing evidence"
for a limitation of review to be effective. The Holmes standard
might be stated, "review will not be limited if there is any
indicia in the legislative record that such was not the purpose
of Congress." Even though the deletion of the word "only"
in committee can plausibly be seen as evincing an intent not
to limit review, 0 the Holmes court subjected Section 526(a)(1)
to a more rigorous standard than the presumption of reviewability requires. 8 '

days after action complained of to petition for review). Although the operator's
challenge took place more than sixty days after the cemetery regulation was promulgated, see Holmes, 655 F.2d at 737, the court addressed the issue only fleetingly,
stating there were "serious questions about the propriety" of limiting the availability
of review to that time frame. Id. at 738. Indeed, Justice White felt that the "sixtyday" issue did not merit attention since the Sixth Circuit did not "rule directly" on
it. Watt v. Holmes Limestone Co., 456 U.S. 995, 997 n.4 (1982) (White, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari). The Holmes court unearthed no legislative history regarding the sixty-day provision to cast doubt on its plain meaning yet it intimated that
"clear statutory support" for it was lacking. Holmes, 655 F.2d at 738. Cf. Utah
Int'l v. Department of Interior, 553 F. Supp. 872, 878 (D. Utah 1982) (nothing in
legislative history of the sixty-day provision indicates intent contrary to its literal
meaning). Thus, the Holmes court appears to have resorted to the legislative history
of the venue provision to cast doubt on the sixty-day provision.
7 See SMCRA § 526(a)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1) (1982).
11 See Holmes, 655 F.2d at 741 ("In absence of express provisions ambiguous
statutory language should not be read to foreclose judicial relief.") (Merritt, J.,
concurring).
19 Unlike the Holmes situation, the presumption of reviewability typically comes
into play when the statute itself is silent as to the availability of review. See, e.g.,
Sierra Club v. Peterson, 705 F.2d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1983) (silence should not be
read as foreclosing review when the statute explicitly precludes review); Carter v.
Cleland 643 F.2d 1, 2-4 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Graham v. Caston, 568 F.2d 1092, 1097
(5th Cir. 1978).
10See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
11 Cf. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 131 (1967); Morris v. Gresette,
432 U.S. 491 (1976); Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 104 S. Ct. 2450, 2457
(1984). Regarding the evidentiary standard to be applied, Professor Kenneth Culp
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B. The Holmes Court Failed to Look to the "EntireLegislative
Scheme" in Assessing CongressionalIntent to Limit Review
Further, the Holmes majority failed to consider the "entire
legislative scheme ' 8 2 of SMCRA in its utilization of the policy
against cutting off review. One of the purposes of SMCRA is

to provide nationwide uniform minimum standards for the
surface mining industry. 81 The Holmes approach allowing review of national regulations outside the District of Columbia
would undermine this objective in that it would allow varying
or conflicting interpretations of these regulations among the
districts. This aspect of the Holmes decision has been criticized
84
in several courts.
Rather than weighing the legislative intention favoring national uniformity in its decision to allow review in districts
where mining operations are located, the Holmes majority
focused on the merits of the operator's claim and in essence
offered an opinion that the Secretary's promulgation of the
cemetery regulation 5 represented arbitrary and capricious action." In his concurrence, Justice Merritt criticized this depar-

Davis states:
[i]s
not the proposition that discernible intent of Congress should govern, even if the evidence is not "clear and convincing" more appealing
than the proposition that discernible intent of Congress should be rejected unless it is "clear and convincing"? The Abbott idea of a presumption of reviewability seems better than the Abbott idea that evidence
of intent must be "clear and convincing" in order to control.
K. DAVIs, supra note 27, at § 29.11.
82 Cf. Abbott, 387 U.S. at 141; Morris, 432 U.S. at 501,
505 n.20; Block, 104
S. Ct. at 2456-57.
83 See S. REP. No. 95-128, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 49; H.R. REP. No. 95-218,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 58, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 593,
596 ("The [House and Senate] Committees also explained that inadequacies in existing
state laws and the need for uniform minimum nationwide standards made federal
regulations imperative."). See also SMCRA § 102(g), 30 U.S.C. § 1201(g) (1982)
(minimum standards insure fair competition in interstate commerce).
14See, e.g., Drummond Coal Co., 735 F.2d at 474-75; Tug Valley Recovery
Center v. Watt, 703 F.2d 796, 799 n.3 (4th Cir. 1982); Virginia Ex Rel. Va. Dep't
of Conservation v. Watt, 741 F.2d 37, 40-41 (4th Cir. 1984); Watt v. Holmes
Limestone Co., 456 U.S. 995, 997 (1982) (White, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari); United States v. Troup, 821 F.2d 194, 199 (3d Cir. 1987).
" 30 C.F.R. § 761.5 (1979).
" See SMCRA
§ 526(a)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1) (1982) (action subject to
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ture from the purely jurisdictional issue before the court,
characterizing it as "nothing more than a strongly-worded
personal opinion."8' 7 Unlike the majority, Justice Merritt did
give consideration to the "uniformity" issue. He acknowledged

the importance of establishing uniform national standards under SMCRA, but found that this "policy" must yield to the
"paramount" policy of the presumption of reviewability of
final agency actions 88 This represents a problematical application of the presumption of reviewability because a proper
application requires that the overall "legislative scheme" be
assessed as part of the inquiry as to whether Congress intended

to limit review.8

9

Justice Merritt engaged in an abstract balanc-

judicial review shall be affirmed unless arbitrary and capricious or inconsistent with
the law); In Re Surface Mining Regulation, 456 F. Supp 1301, 1309 (D. D.C. 1978)
(Secretary must show some support for challenged regulation to satisfy arbitrary and
capricious standard, but is not required to show the regulation is the best or only
possible method of regulation); Comment, Judicial Review of Regulations Promulgated Under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 81 W. VA.
L. REv. 785, 790-91 (1979). See generally Delong, Informal Rulemaking and the
Integration of Law and Policy, 65 VA. L. REV. 257, 286 (1979) (courts are requiring
more information from administrative agencies so as to make informed decisions in
applying the arbitrary and capricious standard, but the rule will stand unless it is
"demonstrably irrational").
The Holmes court found the cemetery regulation to be arbitrary, stating that
,t[w]ithout any reason the Secretary could have named 150 feet or 50 feet" as the
limiting standard. See Holmes, 655 F.2d at 738. The court also intimated that the
regulation was inconsistent with law: "there is no evidence that Congress ever
intended to regulate private family burial plots not open to the public." Id. Contra
In Re Permanent Surface Mining Litig., 620 F. Supp. 1519, 1558 (D.D.C. 1985).
The controversy in Holmes might have been avoided if provision for a waiver
of the 100 foot cemetery limitation had been provided in the Act. Exceptions or
waivers are provided to allow mining in other areas which are otherwise "unsuitable"
under section 522 such as national forests, see SMCRA § 522(e)(2), 30 U.S.C. §
1272(e)(2) (1982); private homes, see SMCRA § 522(e)(5), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(5) (1982);
and premises listed in the National Register of Historic Sites, see SMCRA § 522(e)(3),
30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(3) (1982). See In Re Permanent Surface Mining Litig., 620 F.
Supp. at 1558 (Congress' failure to allow for exceptions to 100 foot cemetery limitation is not evidence that limitation was not meant to apply to private burial
grounds). For an Article advocating more extensive use of waivers and exceptions to
the Act's prohibitions, see generally Gage, The Failure of the Interim Regulatory
Program Under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977: The Need
for Flexible Controls, 81 W. VA. L. REV. 595 (1979).
" See Holmes, 655 F.2d at 741.
Id. at 740.
See, e.g., Abbott, 387 U.S. at 141; Morris, 432 U.S. at 501, 505 n. 20; Block,
104 S. Ct. at 2456-57.
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ing process instead of looking to SMCRA's legislative scheme

as a legitimate source of congressional intent to limit review.
In sum, the majority opinion in Holmes incorrectly ignored
the congressional intention that there be uniform national
standards under the Act, while the concurrence sidestepped the
issue by characterizing that intention as a "policy" to be
balanced against-rather than analyzed as a component ofthe policy against limiting review of final agency actions.
III.

"DRUMMOND II"

The Holmes approach allowing varying interpretations of
national regulations among the districts leaves open the possibility of the waste of time and judicial resources such as
occurred in the "duplicate" cases of Drummond Coal Co. v.
Watt 90 and Drummond Coal Co. v. Hodel.91 These cases
involved an operator who challenged a national regulation
simultaneously in the district court where the mining operation
was located and the District Court for the District of Columbia. 92 The latter court stayed the action pending final disposition of the action in Alabama. 93 As noted above, 94 the Eleventh

Circuit ruled that the District Court for the Northern District
of Alabama (which had ruled on the merits) lacked jurisdiction
and reversed and vacated the case. The District Court for the
District of Columbia then lifted the stay to once again consider
the merits. 95 One can detect the court's exasperation in the
following comment:
For the purposes of this suit at this point in the proceedings,
it matters little whether the jurisdictional decision of the
Eleventh Circuit in the "duplicate" case filed in Alabama
would or would not be held appropriate upon review by the
Supreme Court. Regardless whether this Court has concurrent or exclusive jurisdiction, the statute plainly provides the

" See Drummond Coal Co. v. Watt, 735 F.2d 469 (11th Cir. 1984).
" See Drummond Coal Co. v. Hodel, 610 F. Supp 1489 (D.D.C. 1985) (cited
in short form as Hodel).
See Drummond Coal, 735 F.2d at 470 n.1, 471 n.3.
Id. at 470 n.3.
9 See supra notes 47-55 and accompanying text.
See Hodel, 610 F. Supp at 1494.
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District Court for the District of Columbia with jurisdiction
96
in some form over a challenge to national regulations.

Until the Supreme Court rules on Section 526(a)(1), 97 the potential for the Drummond scenario and its attendant lamentable waste of judicial resources still exists.
CONCLUSION

The plain language of Section 526(a)(1) and the desire for
uniform minimum national standards which is manifest in
SMCRA's "legislative scheme" provide at least the clear and
convincing evidence necessary that Congress intended to make
review of national regulations exclusive to the District Court
for the District of Columbia. The Holmes interpretation paves
the way for inconsistent and conflicting interpretations of nationally applicable regulations and hence undercuts the
congressional desire for uniformity. In addition, the Holmes
approach allows for a reoccurrence of the Drummond scenario
in which time, money, and judicial resources are expended in
a challenge to a regulation which merely results ultimately in
a finding that the district court where the mining operation is
located lacked jurisdiction. All the other circuits which have
considered the issue 9s have given effect to "Congress' carefully
devised plan" 99 that the Secretary's promulgation of national
regulations be subject to review exclusively in the District
Court for the District of Columbia. The Holmes holding frustrates that plan.
JOHN CATO FOGLE III

IId. at 1495.

The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Holmes case. Watt v. Holmes
Limestone Co., 456 U.S. 995 (1982). The issue again evaded review in Virginia Ex.
Rel. Va. Dep't of Conservation v. Watt, 741 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. granted
sub. nom, Virginia Dep't of Conservation v. Clark, 105 S. Ct. 379 (1984), cert.
dismissed, 105 S. Ct. 983 (1985).
91Drummond Coal Co. v. Watt, 735 F.2d 796 (l1th Cir. 1984); Tug Valley
Recovery Center v. Watt, 703 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1982); Virginia Ex. Rel. Va. Dept.
of Conservation v. Watt, 741 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Troup, 821
F.2d 194 (3d Cir. 1987).
" See Watt v. Holmes Limestone Co., 456 U.S. 995, 997 (1982).

